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CHAPTER 2
Sewall Wright’s Adaptive Landscape:
Philosophical Reflections on
Heuristic Value
Robert A. Skipper, Jr. and Michael R. Dietrich
2.1 Introduction
Sewall Wright’s 1932 Adaptive Landscape diagram
is arguably the most influential visual heuristic in
evolutionary biology, yet the diagram has met with
criticism from biologists and philosophers since its
origination. In our view, the diagram is a valu-
able evaluation heuristic for assessing the dynam-
ical behavior of population genetics models (Skip-
per 2004). Although Wright’s particular use of it
is of dubious value, other biologists have estab-
lished the diagram’s positive heuristic value for
evaluating dynamical behavior. In what follows, we
will survey some of the most influential biologi-
cal and philosophical work considering the role of
the Adaptive Landscape in evolutionary biology.
We will build on a distinction between models,
metaphors, and diagrams to make a case for why
Adaptive Landscapes as diagrams have heuristic
value for evolutionary biologists.
2.2 Sewall Wright’s Adaptive Landscape
E. M. East invited the architects of theoretical pop-
ulation genetics, R. A. Fisher, J. B. S. Haldane,
and Sewall Wright, to present their work at the
1932 Sixth International Congress of Genetics. They
were to present compact and accessible forms
of their seminal but mathematically intimidating
work on evolutionary theory. Wright’s principal
evolutionary paper was his 1931, “Evolution in
Mendelian Populations” (Wright 1931). The paper
Wright delivered at the congress in 1932 was, basi-
cally, a distillation of the 1931 paper, and was pub-
lished in the proceedings as “The Roles of Mutation,
Inbreeding, Crossbreeding and Selection in Evolu-
tion” (Wright 1932). The Adaptive Landscape was
first publicly presented in the 1932 paper.
Wright’s aim in the 1931/1932 papers was to
determine the ideal conditions for evolution to
occur given specific assumptions about the relation-
ship between Mendelian heredity and the adaptive
value of gene complexes (Wright 1931, 1932). In
Wright’s 1932 paper, he used the Adaptive Land-
scape diagram to demonstrate his solution (see
Chapter 5).
According to Wright (1932), accurately represent-
ing the population genetics of the evolutionary
process requires thousands of dimensions. This is
because the field of possible gene combinations of
a population is vast (approximately 101000). Wright
used the two-dimensional graphical depiction of
an Adaptive Landscape in Fig. 2.1a as a way of
intuitively conveying what can only be accurately
represented in thousands of dimensions. Wright’s
interpretation of his diagrams is confusing, as we
will discuss later in this chapter. The surface of the
landscape is typically understood as representing
populations with each point on the landscape repre-
senting a unique combined set of allele frequencies.
Each point or population is then graded for adap-
tive value. Presumably, populations with very sim-
ilar sets of alleles at similar frequencies will have
similar adaptive values and so the adaptive sur-
face will show relatively gradual transitions from
low to high adaptive value, although this is not a
necessary condition. The surface of the landscape
is very “hilly,” says Wright, because of epistatic
16
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Figure 2.1 Wright’s (1932, pp. 161–163) key figures. (a) Wright’s
Adaptive Landscape diagram. (b) Diagrams depict evolution occurring on
the Adaptive Landscape under alternative assumptions. Genetics by
GENETICS SOCIETY OF AMERICA. Copyright 1932. Reproduced with
permission of GENETICS SOCIETY OF AMERICA.
relations between genes, the consequences of which
(for Wright) are that genes adaptive in one combina-
tion are likely to be maladaptive in another. Given
Wright’s view of epistasis and the vastness of the
field of gene combinations in a field of gene fre-
quencies, Wright estimates the number of adaptive
“peaks” separated by adaptive “valleys” at 10800.
Peaks are represented by “+”; valleys are repre-
sented by “–.”
The Adaptive Landscape diagram sets up
Wright’s signature problem, viz., the problem of
peak shifts (see Chapter 6). That is, given that the
Adaptive Landscape is hilly, the ideal conditions
for evolution to occur must allow a population to
shift from peak to peak to find the highest peak.
Otherwise, a population would remain fixed at the
nearest local peak regardless of its adaptive value.
In Wright’s 1931 paper, he demonstrated mathe-
matically the statistical distributions of genes under
alternative assumptions of population size, muta-
tion rate, migration rate, selection intensity, etc. In
the 1932 paper, the graphs displaying the results
appear, and he uses them in combination with the
landscape diagram to argue for his three-phase
shifting balance model of the evolutionary process
(window F in Fig. 2.1b) as the solution to his prob-
lem of peak shifts via assessments of alternative
models of the process (windows A–E in Fig. 2.1b).
Wright’s view was that his “shifting balance” pro-
cess of evolution satisfied the ideal conditions for
evolution to occur. Evolution in the shifting balance
process occurs in three phases: Phase I—random
genetic drift causes subpopulations semi-isolated
within the global population to lose fitness; Phase
II—selection on complex genetic interaction sys-
tems raises the fitness of those subpopulations;
Phase III—interdemic selection then raises the fit-
ness of the large or global population.
2.3 Models, metaphors, and diagrams
Wright’s 1931 exposition of his shifting balance
theory relied on a series of mathematical models.
When he presented his work for a general biolog-
ical audience in 1932, he chose to describe the ele-
ments, behaviors, and consequences of these mod-
els by developing a metaphor and interpretations
of a series of diagrams. These different entities, i.e.
models, metaphors, and diagrams, are recognized
by philosophers of science and some biologists as
having importantly different features and signifi-
cantly different roles in the manufacture of scientific
knowledge.
Diagrams are visual representations that use spa-
tial configurations within an image to convey infor-
mation (Perini 2004, 2005). Understanding how
the form of a representation assigns meaning or
content is a major topic among scholars inter-
ested in visual representation (Lynch and Wool-
gar 1990). Extracting the meaning of some images
may involve interpreting an image symbolically
in terms of conventions that associate a particular
form and a particular meaning. For other images,
their meaning can be interpreted in terms of the
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resemblance of the form to the object represented.
For propositionally-oriented philosophers though,
images are one of many forms for conveying infor-
mation and so seem like they ought to be replace-
able by linguistic descriptions (Ruse 1996; Perini
2005). Other philosophers eager to explain why
images are so prevalent in science, see them as a
particularly concise and effective way of communi-
cating complex information, such as the functional
relationships between different molecular struc-
tures to form the active site of an enzyme (Perini
2005).
Models, like many diagrams, are extralin-
guistic representations. However, the relation-
ships between the variables and parameters of a
model are articulated linguistically and mathemat-
ically (Lloyd 1988). Philosophers advocating the
semantic approach to theories have developed a
sophisticated understanding of the features of bio-
logical models in terms of rules of coexistence, inter-
action, and temporal succession for the variables
and parameters in any particular type of model. In
other words, the semantic approach views theories
as models describing the many different relation-
ships between a set of variables and parameters.
An important feature of the semantic approach is
its natural understanding of models in contempo-
rary biology (Lloyd 1988). Richard Lewontin, for
instance, defines a scientific model as a set of enti-
ties with corresponding quantities that are con-
nected to each other by rules of transformation
(Lewontin 1963, 1974).
Two of the central virtues of scientific models
are that they allow scientists to make very precise
claims about relationships between variables in the
models and that they allow scientists to make pre-
cise claims about which empirical entities are repre-
sented by which features of that model. Metaphors
by contrast depend on an analogy between two
objects or two systems (Hesse 1966). A metaphor
is an accurate analogy in so far as its components
and relationships correspond to the object and rela-
tionships with which it is meant to be compared.
A metaphor is didactically useful, however, in so
far as it allows us to understand those elements and
relationships better by way of analogy (Lewontin
1963). The didactic function of the Adaptive Land-
scape as a metaphor depends on our familiarity
with actual hilly landscapes and their representa-
tion as topographical maps.
We are convinced that the metaphor of the Adap-
tive Landscape has been didactically useful in gen-
erating novel theoretical and empirical paths of
inquiry. In the remainder of this essay, we justify
our claim by evaluating influential criticisms of the
usefulness of the metaphor, analyzing a series of
criticisms of Wright’s version of the Adaptive Land-
scape, and describing the way in which we under-
stand the didactic role of the metaphor.
2.4 Questioning value of the Adaptive
Landscape diagram
There is considerable agreement among biologists
and philosophers that Wright’s particular version
of the Adaptive Landscape is flawed. Roughly, this
agreement revolves around the extent to which
Wright’s evolutionary assumptions in fact under-
write a hilly landscape of the sort depicted, and
therefore the problem of peak shifts, that he thought
is so central to evolutionary biology. Among these
same biologists and philosophers, however, is sharp
disagreement about the heuristic value of the Adap-
tive Landscape diagram. Some, notably William
Provine (1986) and Jonathan Kaplan (2008), argue
that Wright’s Adaptive Landscape ought to be
abandoned as a visual representation of the evo-
lutionary process because confusions surrounding
its interpretation have led scientists down fruit-
less paths of inquiry.1 Others, such as Michael
Ruse (1996), Robert Skipper (2004), and Anya Plu-
tynski (2008), argue that in spite of the techni-
cal problems with Wright’s diagram and the fact
that as a heuristic it may lead scientists astray, the
Adaptive Landscape metaphor has led and will
continue to lead scientists down fruitful paths of
inquiry. We endorse this latter position in the fol-
lowing critical analysis of the Adaptive Landscape
metaphor. We begin with those who adopt the for-
mer view.
1 Pigliucci and Kaplan (2006) and Pigliucci (2008) come very close to this view.
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Provine (1986), Wright’s biographer, harshly crit-
icized Wright’s view of the Adaptive Landscape.
Provine argues that Wright interpreted the diagram
in two main ways. First, Wright (1932, 1977) inter-
preted the diagram as the multidimensional field of
all possible gene combinations graded for their adap-
tive value. Call this the genotype interpretation. Sec-
ond, Wright (correspondence to Fisher, 3 February
1931 in Provine 1986; Wright 1939, 1978) inter-
preted Fig. 2.1a as the multidimensional field of
joint frequencies of all genes in a population graded
for their adaptive value Call this the population
interpretation.
According to Provine (1986), Wright’s genotype
interpretation of the diagram is mathematically
incoherent and the two interpretations are incom-
mensurable. Provine claims that on the genotype
interpretation each axis of the graphic is a gene
combination. But, Provine argues, there are no gra-
dations along the axes, no indications of what the
units along the axes are, and no point along them
to indicate where a gene combination is to be
placed. Given this, Provine concludes that there is
no way of generating the continuous surface rep-
resented in Fig. 2.1a. On the population interpre-
tation, Provine argues, each point on the surface
represents a population, and the entire surface is
of mean population fitness rather than genotype
fitness. Each axis is now graded between 0 and 1
for gene frequency; the result is a continuous sur-
face. However, Provine claims, there is no way to
plot genotype fitness values on the surface of gene
frequencies; one is attempting to plot individual
haplotypes onto a surface of which the points are
populations. The result is a surface that collapses
into a single point because the axes are incom-
patible. For these reasons, Provine concludes that
Wright’s Adaptive Landscape diagram does not
successfully illustrate the shifting balance process
and, so, must be abandoned.
Wright (1988) responded to Provine’s criticism
by uncritically claiming that Provine confused a
metaphor for a mathematical model. Ruse (1996)
develops the criticism and rightly disagrees with
Provine: even if Wright’s interpretation of the dia-
gram is incoherent (meaning that it does not accu-
rately represent Wright’s mathematical model), it
may still be a valuable heuristic. Ruse thinks
that Provine’s assessment of the heuristic value of
Wright’s diagram is too conservative. Heuristics are
devices that are used to generate paths of inquiry
whether those paths are fruitful or not. The fact
that Wright’s interpretation of the diagram does not
cohere with his mathematical models is beside the
point. Rather, because uses of the diagram have a
track record of generating fruitful paths of inquiry,
it is a valuable heuristic. Ruse cites T. Dobzhansky
(1951), G. G. Simpson (1953), G. Ledyard Stebbins
(1969), and C. H. Waddington (1956) as having used
the Adaptive Landscape to produce apparently
positive results: Dobzhansky used the landscape
to illustrate the shifting balance process, Simpson
used the landscape to illustrate species and speci-
ation, and Waddington used the diagram for his
own illustrative purposes in population genetics.
Moreover, the biological work we discuss later in
this essay includes instances of the heuristic used
to produce positive results, as we will see (briefly)
(see Chapter 1). Provine’s doubts about the heuris-
tic value of the Adaptive Landscape diagram are
misplaced.
Kaplan (2008) argues that the Adaptive Land-
scape metaphor in general ought to be abandoned.
Kaplan lists a number of complaints about the dia-
gram, e.g. it is not explanatory in the way a mathe-
matical model is, the diagram does not map onto
a relevant mathematical model, it is imprecise, it
lacks a univocal heuristic role, and it has done
more to confuse than to enlighten. But the main
point of Kaplan’s argument is that the diagram is
no longer useful given the continued growth in
computational power that we are experiencing with
respect to scientific modeling. That is, there is no
need for a simplified landscape diagram when biol-
ogists have access to computational power that will
allow them to build models that will more pre-
cisely do the work that the landscape diagram is
meant to do. Kaplan then recommends biologists
abandon the diagram in favor of computational
models.
Many of Kaplan’s complaints are familiar.
Indeed, the Adaptive Landscape diagram has led
biologists astray, it is not explanatory in the way
that a mathematical model is, it is imprecise,
and so on. We think these criticisms are mis-
placed. One certainly expects mathematical models
OUP CORRECTED PROOF– FINAL, 3/5/2012, SPi
20 PART I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
to be explanatory, precise, etc. But, in the vein of
Wright’s and Ruse’s arguments against Provine,
these demands are misdirected when aimed at the
landscape diagram. Wright developed the Adap-
tive Landscape in an effort to defend his shift-
ing balance process in an intuitive, informal way
using a simple, unlabeled topographical map as a
metaphor for the mean fitness of populations. It
is wrongheaded to expect such a heuristic to meet
the standards of a mathematical model. Rather,
as we described above, we expect positive analo-
gies from metaphors, but we also expect nega-
tive analogies (Hesse 1966). Nothing Kaplan has
said in criticizing the landscape diagram addresses
it as a metaphor. After all, the diagram may not
meet the expectations we have for mathemati-
cal models, but that does not mean the diagram
does not meet expectations properly construed.
The review of biological work in section 2.5 we
think demonstrates that the diagram is heuristically
valuable.
Finally, it is not at all clear that Kaplan’s sugges-
tion to abandon the landscape diagram in favor of
complex mathematical models is reasonable. Cer-
tainly the suggestion is not descriptive of the way
many if not most population geneticists practice,
though there are exceptions. And, at any rate, we
do not think there is good reason to think that the
computational power that is available to biologists
is sufficient to yield a biologically realistic popu-
lation genetics model. Idealizations and simplifica-
tions are the norm and will no doubt continue to be
the norm.
We think Provine’s and Kaplan’s reasons to reject
the Adaptive Landscape diagram are poor. Both
seem to think that the diagram must play the role
of an explanatory model, and because it cannot do
that, it is a defective scientific tool. For Provine,
the diagram is simply a failure. For Kaplan, the
diagram has led scientists down fruitless paths
of inquiry. On our view, not all aspects of scien-
tific models are explanatory; some are metaphorical
(Lewontin 1963). These metaphorical elements play
heuristic roles in scientific theorizing. And heuris-
tics are rules of thumb, i.e. strategies that work
well sometimes but not always. We now consider a
patchwork of biological work that suggest that the
Adaptive Landscape metaphor is a valuable heuris-
tic in spite of the flaws in Wright’s particular view
of it (cf. Plutynski 2008).
2.5 The case for heuristic value
Fisher immediately pointed out the central prob-
lem for Wright’s version of the diagram. Fisher
and Wright discussed the landscape metaphor
in correspondence prior to the 1932 presentation
(Wright correspondence to Fisher, 3 February 1931
in Provine 1986, pp. 271–273; Fisher correspondence
to Wright, 31 May, 1931 in Provine 1986, p. 274).
According to Fisher, the Adaptive Landscape dia-
gram is flawed because, in fact, as the dimension-
ality of the field of gene combinations in the field
of gene frequencies increases the number of stable
peaks on the surface of the landscape decreases (see
also Fisher 1941). Thus, claims Fisher, representa-
tion of the mean fitness of populations in multi-
ple dimensions will not result in a hilly landscape,
but one that is a single peak with ridges along it.
As a consequence, evolution on the landscape does
not require the complex of evolutionary factors of
Wright’s shifting balance process, but only selection
and mutation. Fisher’s informal critique of Wright
was taken up perhaps most influentially by P. A. P.
Moran (1964), A. W. F. Edwards (1994), and Jerry
Coyne et al. (1997). Mark Ridley (1996) developed
an Adaptive Landscape diagram based on Fisher’s
critique, reproduced in Fig. 2.2a (see Chapter 4).
Sergey Gavrilets (1997, 1999, 2004) has criticized
Wright’s version of the landscape. On Gavrilets’s
view, the Adaptive Landscape in multiple dimen-
sions will not have adaptive peaks and valleys.
Instead, the landscape will be the holey one
depicted in Fig. 2.2b. That is, the higher the num-
ber of possible gene combinations in a field of
gene frequencies, the higher the number of incom-
patible combinations in that field. The incompat-
ible gene combinations cause reproductive isola-
tion within populations, which cause genetically-
driven speciation events. The holes represent loca-
tions of incompatible combinations of genes and
replace the peaks. Gavrilets’s argument, as he rec-
ognizes, is based on a set of specific assump-
tions that must be relaxed in fundamental ways if
his theoretical intuitions are to be tested empiri-
cally. Gavrilets assumes that (1) fitnesses of gene
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Figure 2.2 Four Adaptive Landscape diagrams, resulting from critiques of Wright’s 1932 diagram. (a) Ridley’s (1996, p. 219) depiction of a Fisherian
landscape. Evolution. 2nd edition. Copyright 1997. Reproduced with permission of Wiley-Blackwell. (b) Gavrilets’s (1997, p. 309) depiction of the holey
landscape. Trends in Ecology and Evolution. Copyright 1997. Reproduced with permission of Elsevier. (c) Coyne et al.’s (1997, p. 647) simplified Wrightian
landscape. Reproduced from Coyne, J., Barton, N., and Turelli, M. (1997), “Perspective: A Critique of Sewall Wright’s Shifting Balance Theory of Evolution”,
Evolution 51: 643–671 (d) The Kauffman and Levin (1987, p. 33) rugged Adaptive Landscape. The Journal of Theoretical Biology. Copyright 1987.
Reproduced with permission of Elsevier.
complexes are generated randomly; (2) fitnesses
are generated independently; and (3) fitness val-
ues are either 0 or 1. Nevertheless, Gavrilets (1999)
has discussed the evolutionary dynamics of spe-
ciation on holey landscapes as driven by random
genetic drift, mutation, recombination, and migra-
tion. Indeed, Gavrilets points out that Wright’s
apparently restrictive combination of drift, mass
selection, interdemic selection, and migration is not
necessary to traverse the Adaptive Landscape if
Gavrilets is correct. There are, after all, no adaptive
valleys between peaks to pass through.
A series of papers by collaborators working on
the genotype–phenotype map problem have raised
an issue against Wright’s version of the landscape
diagram that is related to that of Gavrilets (e.g.
Fontana and Schuster 1998; B. Stadler et al. 2001;
P. Stadler 2002). The basic claim here is that a dis-
continuous landscape surface is more likely than a
continuous one. The argument, however, is differ-
ent. Roughly, the argument is that taking seriously
the developmental processes involved in going
from genotype to phenotype in evolution, one will
discover that there are many phenotypes inacces-
sible from genotypes, resulting in discontinuities
on the surface of the landscape. The argument is
rooted in computational work on the biophysical
genotype–phenotype model defined by the folding
of RNA sequences into secondary structures. The
RNA sequences are considered to be genotypes,
and the role of the phenotype is played by the struc-
ture of the molecule. Based on this model, a general,
mathematical theory of landscapes has resulted,
reaching far beyond the informal use of topograph-
ical map-making that Wright used in 1932. Despite
the implications for Wright’s landscape, apparently
a landscape on which to depict evolutionary trajec-
tories in population genetics based on the general
landscape theory is not immediately forthcoming
due to constraints on computational power.
Although there are serious problems for Wright’s
view that he can transform a hilly landscape in
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two dimensions into a hilly landscape in thousands
of dimensions, the notion that there are simple
cases of hilly landscapes persists (e.g. Coyne et al.
1997, p. 647). Indeed, in simple and rather restric-
tive cases, i.e. two loci cases assuming complete
dominance at each locus, Wright’s landscape has
been given some plausibility (e.g. Lande 1976, 1979;
Coyne et al. 1997) (Fig. 2.2c). Further, Kauffman and
Levin (1987) responded to problems for Wright’s
view of the landscape by developing “rugged
Adaptive Landscapes” as a way of understand-
ing the fitness of gene combinations given simple
Wrightian epistatic gene interaction (Fig. 2.2d). In
Kauffman and Levin’s NK model, the fitness con-
tribution of each of N loci depends in a random
way on K other loci. The parameter K describes the
degree of epistasis. If K = 0, then an Adaptive Land-
scape with one peak results. But as K increases,
the number of peaks on the landscape increases
and the mean fitness of the nearest peak decreases
toward that of an entirely random genotype. Typ-
ically, the result is a rugged Adaptive Landscape.
Kauffman and Levin’s work has been applied in
biochemistry (e.g. Fontana et al. 1989, 1991, 1993),
and interestingly that work is a principal ancestor of
the genotype–phenotype mapping work discussed
earlier. Kauffman (1993) extends the use of rugged
Adaptive Landscapes in his work on complexity
and on artificial life modeling.
Notice that these biologists do not view the land-
scape diagram as a failed heuristic. Rather, each
critically evaluates the foundational assumptions of
the other out of which a new Adaptive Landscape
metaphor is created, along with new, arguably fruit-
ful paths of inquiry. This pattern of contrasts can be
seen across all of the cases discussed, but consider
the contrast between Fisher’s single-peak landscape
and Wright’s hilly landscape. The single-peak land-
scape reflects Fisher’s view that there is one optimal
gene combination, which can be found by the com-
bination of mutation and selection. Wright’s hilly
landscape reflects his emphasis on the evolutionary
effects of epistatic gene interaction.
For Wright, genes adaptive in one combination
will be maladaptive in another. The consequence
of such epistasis was, for Wright, a hilly Adap-
tive Landscape. More generally, depending on the
basic genetic assumptions in a model, whether it
is Fisher’s, Wright’s, Coyne’s, Gavrilets’s, etc. the
corresponding surface of selective value will take
different forms. Indeed, it is important to note that it
is the set of core genetic assumptions embedded in a
population genetics model rather than assumptions
about the balance of evolutionary causes that go
toward shaping the surface of an Adaptive Land-
scape. Given that, it seems plausible that while,
for example, Wright’s shifting balance process is
dependent on his version of the Adaptive Land-
scape, the landscape is in no way dependent upon
the shifting balance process (cf. Ruse 1996; Coyne
et al. 1997).
Ultimately, we think the cases we have discussed
demonstrate that these biologists find the heuristic
useful. Next, we describe the way in which we think
the Adaptive Landscape metaphor has been a valu-
able heuristic.
The diagram is used importantly as a model eval-
uation heuristic (Skipper 2004). Indeed, we think
it is clear that Wright used the Adaptive Land-
scape diagram as a visual heuristic to evaluate the
dynamical behavior of population genetics models of
evolutionary processes constructed with alternative
assumptions to demonstrate his own. The dynami-
cal behavior of a mathematical model refers to the
way(s) in which some system being described by
the model change(s) according to changes in the
model’s state(s).2 The dynamical behavior of such
a model in population genetics includes, for exam-
ple, the changes in the mean fitness of a popu-
lation against the parameters that hold the mea-
sured intensity of specific evolutionary factors such
as population size, migration rate, selection, muta-
tion, etc. and describes the ways that the states of
the model change. The Adaptive Landscape dia-
gram, as a simplified visualization of common,
core assumption of all the models, is where the
2 Our “dynamical behavior” should not be confused with Lewontin’s (1974) “dynamical sufficiency.” Lewontin’s dynam-
ical sufficiency refers to a model’s empirically being demonstrated to contain all of the relevant parameters, etc. required
to describe evolutionary change. And Lewontin outlines a specific and probably unattainable view of “sufficiency.”
“Dynamical behavior” is a practical specification of one way to assess a much more modest notion of sufficiency.
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evaluation of the behaviors of the models takes
place; the diagram is the heuristic with which the
evaluation is being made. A model is positively
evaluated in case a model system described by it
can traverse the landscape, shifting from one adap-
tive peak to the highest adaptive peak.
Wright assesses the dynamical behavior of evolu-
tionary systems described by six alternative mod-
els, i.e. windows A–F in Fig. 2.1b. Each window
is a piece of the larger Adaptive Landscape in
Fig. 2.1b. What Wright does is to visually depict
the dynamical behavior of a model system on
the landscape. Consider window A in Fig. 2.1b.
Here, Wright sets up a model with the following
assumptions: populations are very large and pan-
mictic, mutation rate is high, selection intensity
and mutation rate are low. Depicting that model
by way of Wright’s landscape, the model system
will not be able to get to the highest adaptive
peak because it will not be able to traverse the
hilly surface—it will not be able to move from its
initial position to a higher peak. Wright repeats
this process in windows B–F, demonstrating how
the dynamical behavior of the various mathemat-
ical models changes as the assumptions change.
Only the model sketched in window F succeeds in
traversing the heuristic landscape; that is the model
Wright interprets as describing the shifting balance
process.
Ultimately, Wright’s evaluative strategy, using
the landscape diagram, led him to his view that evo-
lution is a process that includes a constellation of
factors. That is, out of his evaluation of alternative
evolutionary hypotheses, driven by the landscape
diagram, Wright was led to his shifting balance
process: the evolutionary factors delineated in the
shifting balance process are necessary for travers-
ing the Adaptive Landscape. Now, Wright’s own
heuristic use of the diagram is problematic because
of a flaw in his interpretation of it. However, crit-
ics who have pointed out Wright’s flaw have then
gone on to create landscape diagrams of their own
for the same sorts of assessments. And they fur-
ther use the landscape to assess the dynamical
behavior of alternative population genetics models.
Indeed, Ridley (1996), using his version of the Fishe-
rian landscape, shows that Wright’s shifting balance
process is unnecessary for traversing the landscape:
The models that describe the shifting balance pro-
cess overdetermine the process that is required
given the surface of the landscape. Gavrilets (1997,
2004) shows, using his holey landscape, that nei-
ther Wright’s nor Fisher’s mechanisms are neces-
sary to traverse the landscape. In Gavrilets’s case,
Wright’s shifting balance process is unnecessary
because there are no peaks. And Coyne et al. (1997)
show that, in simple cases, Wright’s three-phase
evolutionary process is one among many possi-
ble mechanisms for traversing a hilly landscape.
The Adaptive Landscape diagram is valuable, in
spades, as a heuristic for evaluating the dynamical
behavior of evolutionary models (Skipper 2004).
2.6 Conclusion
In spite of the fact that Wright’s Adaptive Land-
scape diagram is one of the most influential visual
heuristic in evolutionary biology, there has been
considerable confusion about whether it is actu-
ally valuable in that role. We have argued that the
confusion about the heuristic value of the diagram
is rooted in misunderstandings about models and
metaphors. The landscape diagram is not a math-
ematical model; it is a visual metaphor intended
to represent the ways in which a system described
by a mathematical model may behave. Broadly,
metaphors play a didactic and not explanatory
role in scientific theorizing. The Adaptive Land-
scape plays that didactic role as a model assessment
heuristic. Understanding the diagram in this way
makes it clear why the Adaptive Landscape has
been so influential.
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